Howard University

Digital Howard @ Howard University
Selected Speeches

J. Clay Smith, Jr. Collection

6-12-1987

A Response to Professor Robert E. Park's "Giving
Meaning to the Constitution: Competing Visions
of Judicial Review"
J. Clay Smith Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://dh.howard.edu/jcs_speeches
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, J. Clay Jr., "A Response to Professor Robert E. Park's "Giving Meaning to the Constitution: Competing Visions of Judicial
Review"" (1987). Selected Speeches. Paper 106.
http://dh.howard.edu/jcs_speeches/106

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the J. Clay Smith, Jr. Collection at Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Selected Speeches by an authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact
lopez.matthews@howard.edu.

J3 \

A Response to Professor Robert E. Park's
"Giving Meaning to the Constitution:
Competing Visions of Judicial Review"
By

J. Clay Snith, Jr.*
Professor Park has provided us with a provocative and enlightened
exposition in his paper entitled, "Giving

~aning

to the Cbnstitution:

Canpeting Visions of Judicial Review."
The question is :

What theme has been offered by the speaker for in-

tellectual consumption?
One theme is central to Professor Park's presentation:

that there

ought to be a nexus between the will of the people and the disposition of
case and controversies decided by the United States Supreme Cburt.
Professor Park names this thane, or describes this thane as
"super-majori tarianism ••• , a new standard for validating or legitimatizing
constitutional interpretations"

during judicial review. S176

I will return to the nexus between the will of the people and judicial
review shortly after I hopefully, properly sUlllJlarize how Professor Park
arrives at "super-majoritarianism" as a legitimate standard for judicial
review.
Professor Park attempts to lay the foundation for "supermajoritarianism"
by coomenting on Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall's Mauri, Hawaii, speech, in
which Marshall concluded that the Cbnsti tution, when adopted, made it an
imperfect, indeed, a flawed document.
*Following Professor Robert E. Park's paper presented at the Twelfth Annual
Meeting of the District of Oolmnbia Court of Appeals Judicial Conference on
June 12, 1987, J. Clay Snith , Jr., Dean of Howard Universi ty School of law,
responded. Professor Park is a member of the law faculty at George Washington
University School of Law.
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Professor Park concedes that "Justice Marshall did the nation an
~portant

service in reminding [the nation] that the treatment of slavery

by the founding fathers constitutes a continuing blot on the history of

the constititional convention.

~8

Professor Park then closes in on Marshall's language that liThe Constitution [is] a living document" interpreting Marshall's criticisns as substantial justice.

As

a matter of substantive justice, Professor Park has

no objection to Marshall's speech.
However, as a matter of "constitutional analysis, constitutional
reasoning," Professor Park, recognizing that other distinguished scholars indeed the majority of them -- hold Marshall's "popular" view, says that
Marshall presents a "highly controversial theory of how we should interpret
the Constitution."

~9

Throughout his paper, Professor Park stalks the question: "do we have
a living Constitution?"

He pokes and tugs at the question because, fran my

point of view, he is very uncomfortable with all standards of judicial
review accepted as legi timate by the majority of jurisprudents today.
Professor Park is very deferential to his peers and bends over backwards not to offend.

However, like an ordinary scholar in the jungle of

ideas, his intellectual guerilla warfare results in casualties.

Word

has it that three theoretical standards of judicial review have fallen
in Professor Park's classroom of ideas at George WaShington Law School,
where he teaches.
Casual ty One.

Original Intent.

This theme emphasizes that the Cbnstitution is a legal document, and
analogizes it to other legal documents, like contracts and wills.
Park

a~s

Professor

his intellectual gun at original intent and strikes a telling

blow to this theme because he believes it has "severe constraint upon the
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use of judicial power. It

~83 .1

Rather, Professor Park suggests that

It

the

original language must become increasingly merely a starting point. It '137
NOt without reservations, he concludes that "the evidence of [original]
intent is ••• fragmented [even] thin ••• It
casual ty Tv.o.

'140

The Instrtmlental (or Political) Constitution.

This theme, he says, uses constitutional law for a judicial political
agenda; it is not neutral, but result-oriented.
Professor Park like this one?

'83.3

Why doesn't

He says that the Instrumentalists "bring to

constitutional law ••• a ••• set of preferred outcomes ••• and [their]
values are bent to serve these outcanes.1t
Casual ty Three.

'149

The Moral Constitution

The moralist barely escapes the academic machine gun of Professor
Park.

The moral Constitution " treats consi tutional inquiry as moral

inquiry:"

a moral mandate, and discounts procedure, legal coherence,

precedents and logic, and stands as a bare assertion, says Professor
Park.

~'83.4,

Surviving:

123

The Living Constitution

The only surviving prisoner of Professor Park's acadanic war is the
Living Constitution, the one that Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall referred
to in his Mauri, Hawaii, speech.

Y13

The Living (bnsti tution anphasizes

the inescapability of change, and perceives the Constitution as the focal
point of what is, at least by analogy, a continuing constitutional convention.

'83.2

Professor Park also draws on the words of Mr. Justice

William Brennan as falling under the Living {bnsti tution umbrella. '12
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Let's return to the standard of judicial review offered by Professor
Park.

In reading his paper, one must constantly keep their eyes on the

noble objective of its author:

he seeks a new standard of judicial re-

view tenned .. super-majori tarianism of American Sovereignty" invol ving
the interpretation of the United States Constitution.

~4l

What method or logic does Professor Park utilize to reach his conclusion that there should be a nexus between court decisions and the will of
the people?
First, he points our attention to the fact that some of the Framers
of the Constitution such as Randolph, insisted that the ratification should
be referred to the people

(~l5),

as opposed to Cbngress or the state.

Secondly, he points to the Tenth Amendment that the implied sovereignty
resides in the states, the political unit nearest the people.
Thirdly, he points to the Amendment Process which requires ratification
by 3/4 of the states.
These references to constitutional history seem to be the gravamen of
Professor Park's theory of "super-majoritarianisn."
Professor Park points his magnifying glass at the Constitution and concludes that the Constitution is a body of words fran which few rules can be
drawn without interpretation.

He rightly concludes that much of the con-

stitutional law is unwritten.
The people live by and are affected by the unwritten Constitution.
Park asks:

How can the gap, the ambiguities, the meaning of the words

in the Cbnstitution, be made legitimate to the people of the nation?
Indeed,

how

can our instrument of rule, the Constitution, be authoritative?

The answer is that the language of the Cl:>nsti tution, its words and
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phrases, its dashes and dots, are authoritative, if their interpretation
is canalized, wi thin bounds of legitimate interpretation.
Again, I remind you that Professor Park has a stated goal in his paper
and that beckons us to consider "super-majoritarianism" as a standard for
judicial review of constitutional claims.

I get the feeling, even with

the deference paid to traditional, or popular standards of judicial review,
that such standards do not satisfy Professor Park's test of legitimacy,
or authenticity. (,-44)

In fact, the unstated rumblings in his paper may

even suggest that modern standards of judicial review of constitutional
claims are authoritarian.

These rumblings are heard via his words which

indirectly ask where do judges get the power, if there is any, to reinterpret, to recast and to refonn the Constitution of the United States? '138
It sounds like an Edward Meese or Judge Robert Bark question, but Professor
Park would assure us, I think, that he is not in that analytical camp.
What then is the vision of Professor Park concernig judicial review?
What makes the analysis of constitutional interpretation authentic to or
legit~te

for

h~?

Professor Park could be satisfied with the following six criteria:
1) It should be plainly grounded in the constitutional text.
2) It should set limits to judicial decisions. 3) It should not
frustrate the need for legit~te constitutional adaptation and
innovation. 4) It should be consistent with the democratic
values and the scheme of federalism implicit in the Cbnstit~
tion. 5) It should be usable by judges deciding real cases
on real facts over genuine and heated constitutional controversies.
6) It should constitute a plausible use of the Constitution to
the legal profession and to the people of the United States.
(Y46, f128) (emphasis added)
On its face, the test suggested by Professor Park is neither new or

novel, except, consistent with his general theme of II super-majori tiarianism"

-6he adds, in criteria six language which states that the standard of judicial review is legitimate if it" consti tutes a plausible use of the Consti-

<'46)

tution ••• to the people of the United States."

I sense another rumbling fram Professor Park:

the people of the nation

must believe that the analytical process used by the Federal Courts is
plausible to them as opposed to Ita professional elite". <'56)

Hence, the

judicial review becanes legitimate only if accepted by the people, the
II

super-majori tarians • II
Pursuing his theme of

II

super-majoritarianism, II Professor Park argues

that the issue of legitimacy would be not an issue at all if the analytical
meaning of the <l:>nsti tution came from the people.

In fact, he

II

implies that

the meaning of the document canes fran outside the Constitution ••• II

From

whom does analytical meaning come?

the

people.

Again, Professor Park responds:

Apparently, he thinks that the judiciary should be as accountable

to the people as is the executive and legislative branches of government.
(~163-66)

But, doesn't such a notion collide with Hamilton's Federalist

Paper No. 78, calling for an independent judiciary?
(The Modern Library Ed. n.d.).
sure agree with me.

I think it does.

Professor Park disagrees.

The Federalist 502, 504

Hamilton would, I am
~~180,

181

I think that we should press Professor Park for an answer to this
question:

How many people in the nation are qualified to provide the U. S.

Supreme <l:>urt with analytical advice in deciding cases?
Under the

II

super-majori tarianism" standard of judicial review, prior

to a vote on a case, should the Court ask the pollster what the views are
of the super-majority?

Should what the people say matter to the <l:>urt?

Professor Park himself is sensitive to a criteria for judicial review
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that is so restrictive that the courts employ pollsters as law clerks to
analyze a decision prior to its release.

Y70

Professor Park Justifies his thesis by an analogous reference to the
requirement of 3/4 of the states to ratifying the Oonstitution.
I think we've deter:mined exactly what Professor Park is after by his
analogy:

3/4 of the people must constitute a national super-majority to

validate, authenticate and legitimize a "plausible use of the Oonstitution"
by the Cburts. (Y46, '47)
I'm sure that my interpretation of Professor Park's thesis is correct
because he wants his position understood.

Using Brown v. Board of Education

as an example, Professor Park states that the constitutional analysis and
reasoning of Brown was supported by a changing national value as to equality."
(Y67)

He states that the majority of the people were willing

to

accept

racial equality as a national value; hence, the decision was a "plausible
use of the Cbnstitution."

Professor Park validates the public's acceptance

by referring to Chief Justice Earl Warren's memoirs "that the Cburt received
relatively little mail after the Brown decision, in contrast to same other
cases /'

(~67)

The people may have accepted the principle of equality in the abstract,
but certainly not in the appliciation of Brown.

Professor Park doesn't

provide much guidance on the difference between "plausible use of the
Cbnstitution" as opposed to application.

(~186)

For many Americans, equality in the abstract is akin to Kirkegaard' s
analogy of giving a cookbook to a hungry man.

I su1:mit that the legion of

cases following Brown, among them Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 18 (1954)
fully support my view.

·.
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I think that we owe Professor Park's offer that we consider another
element of judicial review serious consideration:
hUn for his assertions than for to bury

h~

if not for to praise

for making them.

Before closing, as Professor Park himself has pointed out: as a
populous he can live with the

~ving

Constitutionalist.

Their reasoning

is "attractive" to him as a matter of judicial governance.
Park remains skeptical.

Why?

(11"170)

But

He wants the judge's presumption as to

constitutional values to be at least three fourths of the values of the
people.

If tbat quota isn't reached -- under the super-majori tarianisn

standard of judicial review -

the decision of the court is not legi tima te.

I commend Professor Park for his thought-provoking paper.
Ladies and gentlemen!

I now return the podium to the people of the

United States -- Professor Robert E. Park.

